The potential role for collective preferences in determining the rules of the international trading system

The question as to whether “collective preferences” of a given WTO member for values or principles such as environmental protection, food safety, cultural diversity, the public provision of education and health care, precautions in the field of biotechnology or welfare rights, could be jeopardized by the rules of the international trading system has taken a high profile in Europe during the last years of Pascal Lamy’s position as EU DG trade commissioner. Unachieved and criticised for its too narrow focus on alleged European concerns, the debate has ever since been outpaced by the difficulties to conclude the “Doha Development Round” and the need widely perceived that conceptual issues and WTO reform options should be debated after, and not during, the negotiation process.

The view of the authors is that the difficulties to conclude successfully a WTO negotiation round highlight the very issue originally raised by the emergence of collective preferences in international trade.
This analysis, which was prepared for the European Parliament (Tender EP/ExPol/N/2006/2), wraps up the meanings of and rationale for collective preferences policies in the world trading system, and their potential implications on trade rules.